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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS - SUBSTANTIAL EVI-
DENCE - Mead Johnson & Co. v'. Borough of South Plainfield, 95 N.J.
Super. 455, 231 A.2d 816 (1967). - Appellant corporation appealed twojudgments of the New Jersey State Division of Tax Appeals which held it
was not entitled to tax exemptions under a New Jersey statute providing
exemptions for goods stored in a warehouse of any person or corporation
"engaged in the business of storing goods for hire." The court held that
the warehouse in question, although previously owned by appellant, was not
in fact a public warehouse and that the division had no substantial evidence
adequate to support its conclusion.
In New Jersey, as in most American jurisdictions, the factual findings of
administrative agencies are generally not reviewable. A notable exception
to this general rule is when such findings are not supported by substantial
evidence. Though judicial restraint is generally exercised in this area, the
present case clearly illustrates that agencies and boards are not immune fromjudicial review in matters of their discretion.
APPEAL AND ERROR
BRIEFS - DEFECTS, OBJEcrIONS, AND AMENDMENTS - Pope v. Huff-
man, 228 N.E.2d 886 (Ind. Ct. App. 1967). - Plaintiff was granted fore-
closure of a mortgage against the defendant and defendant appealed. In his
brief to the appellate court the defendant failed to comply with the rules of
the Indiana Supreme Court regarding brief writing in two respects: (1) no
summary preceded the argument section of his brief and (2) no authority
was cited in the argument section which contained merely a recital of the
evidence found by the lower court. The court held that defendant's failure
to "substantially comply" with the rules of the supreme court regarding brief
writing would operate as a waiver of any alleged error relied upon in his
appeal.
This case constitutes a reaffirmation of a rule strictly adhered to by the
State courts that any "gross disregard" or "flagrant violation" of the appellate
rules regarding brief writing will result in the appellant waiving any al-
leged error he relied upon for reversal. If the appellant had made a "sincere
effort to comply" with the rules, any minor defects not prejudicial to the
appellee would probably have been overlooked.
ARMED SERVICES
COMPULSORY SERVICE OR DRAFT EVASION - DEFENSES - Thompson v.
United States, 380 F.2d 86 (10th Cir. 1967). - The defendant, a conscien-
tious objector, failed to appeal his 1-A status within 10 days of classification
as required. When he refused to submit to induction, he was convicted for
a violation of the Universal Military Training and Service Act. In uphold-
ing the conviction, the court of appeals held that the defendant was no
longer entitled to assert invalid classification as a defense.
In reaching this decision, the court furthered the Government's policy of
giving the local draft board autonomy concerning extension of appeal rights.
Although the board has the power to grant extensions on the right to ap-
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peal, the courts will not inquire into the correctness of decisions refusing to
grant extensions.
A'roNEy AND CLIENT
SusPENSION AND DISBARMENT - REINSTATEMENT - Barash v. Associa-
tion of the Bar, 20 N.Y.2d 154, 228 N.E.2d 896 (1967). - Plaintiff, a
member of the New York Bar, was convicted of a felony. Under New York
law he was automatically disbarred. On appeal, a United States court of
appeals reversed the felony conviction and remanded for a new trial. Be-
fore the new trial, plaintiff petitioned the appellate division for reinstate-
ment but his petition was denied.
In reversing the appellate division, the New York Court of Appeals
stated that although the plaintiff did not have an automatic right to rein-
statement it was not within the discretion of the appellate division to deny
it simply because the plaintiff was under indictment. Reinstatement could,
of course, be denied if the conduct of the plaintiff warranted it on other
grounds. However, since the conviction had been completely abrogated,
mere indictment could not be a ground for denying the privileges of the
bar. This decision partially overrules the leading New York case on the
subject; Matter of Ginsberg, 1 N.Y.2d 144, 134 N.E.2d 193, 151 N.Y.S.2d
361 (1956), which allowed broad discretion in reinstatement proceedings.
AUTOMOBILES
INJURIES FROM OPBRATION'- WHAT LAW GovERNs - Farber v. Smo-
/ack, 282 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1967). - The defendant loaned his car to his
brother to drive to Florida. On the brother's return to New York, his negli-
gent driving caused an accident to occur in North Carolina in which his
wife was killed and his children injured. The wife's administrator and the
infants' guardian brought this action against the owner under a New York
statute rendering the negligence of an automobile driver attributable to the
owner.
The court of appeals reversed the lower court's dismissal of the action
and granted a new trial, holding that the New York statute applied notwith-
standing the language of the statute that it was applicable to use and opera-
tion of a vehicle "in this state." The court noted that all of the parties
involved were citizens and domiciliaries of New York, the car was registered
in New York, and it was being driven back to New York when the accident
occurred. The court held that New York is the jurisdiction having "the
most significant relationship" with the issue presented. The decision is con-
sistent with the common tendency of courts to find the law of the forum
controlling.
BASTARDS
EVIDENCE - BLOOD TEST - Jackson v. Jackson, 60 Cal. Rptr. 649
(1967). - Plaintiff-husband, having cohabited with his wife for less than
4 days before she left him, filed suit for annulment. During the period that
the court's jurisdiction continued, the defendant gave birth to a child. Plain-
tiff claimed results of blood tests demonstrated that he could not have fa-
thered the child and moved that the court terminate all prior court orders
for support. The trial court refused to admit the blood tests as evidence
and denied the motion to terminate support payments.
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The trial court instructed that the "conclusive presumption of legiti-
macy" applied if the husband had access to his wife during the period of
conception. The Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that if the
husband and wife are not residing together, an exception to the application
of the condusive presumption arises; the presumption becomes rebuttable
and blood test evidence may be admitted to rebut it. The case restates the
law of California allowing blood tests as admissible evidence when the issue
is whether the child could have been conceived during the period of co-
habitation.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
COURSE AND CONDUCT OF TRiAL - JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE - Com-
monwealth v. Dooley, 232 A.2d 45 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967). - Appellant
pleaded guilty to a charge of assault with intent to ravish and was sentenced
under the Barr-Walker Act, which provided for indeterminate sentencing of sex
offenders, to a term of I day to life. Subsequently, a new hearing was or-
dered to meet the due process requirements for such proceedings. Upon
rehearing, appellant's original sentence was reinstated and the court reaf-
firmed the constitutionality of the Barr-Walker Act.
After comparing the Barr-Walker Act with the Colorado Sex Offenders
Act, which was held to deny due process in Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S.
605 (1967), .the superior court in reversing and remanding, reluctantly ruled
that the Barr-Walker Act was similarly deficient. The significance of the
Specht decision, as borne out in the instant case, is that sentencing under an
act that provides for the study, attempted cure, and rehabilitation of sex
deviates is a separate criminal proceeding at which the defendant is entitled
to the full protection of the due process guarantees.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW - JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE - People v. Bailey,
282 N.Y.S.2d 303 (App. Div. 1967). - Defendant pleaded guilty to a
charge of second-degree assault with intent to commit rape. Prior to sen-
tencing the court received a psychiatric report, probation reports, medical
reports, and other relevant information pursuant to New York statutes. On
the basis of the psychiatric report and other information filed with the
court, an indeterminate sentence of 1 day to life was imposed on the de-
fendant.
After distinguishing similar Colorado and Pennsylvania statutes, the ap-
pellate court affirmed the lower court decision and held that the 1-day to
life sentence did not violate due process and was valid despite the fact that
the defendant was not afforded a hearing to controvert the psychiatric re-
port. The court reasoned that the report was merely an amplification of
existing sentencing procedures and not the institution of a new or independ-
ent criminal proceeding. The dissent found no material difference between
the New York statute and the Colorado and Pennsylvania statutes which
have been declared invalid.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH - DEPRIVATION OF PERSONAL RIGHTS - People v.
Street, 20 N.Y.2d 231, 282 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1967). - Defendant was con-
victed of violating a New York statute prohibiting the public desecration of
the American flag. The defendant appealed and the judgment was affirmed.
The court held that the defendant's burning of the American flag as a pro-
test against the shooting of a civil rights leader was an act of incitement
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which was fraught with as much danger to public peace as if he had
stood on the street corner shouting epithets at passing pedestrians. The
court said the State could legitimately curb such activities in the interest of
prevenring violence and maintaining public order, even though defendant's
acts could -be considered a "nonverbal expression" and therefore a form of
speech that would fall within the meaning and protection of the first and
14th amendments.
This decision is consonant with prior New York decisions holding that
if the State can show that the prohibition of certain conduct is designed to
promote the public health, safety, or well-being, then the fact that such pro-
hibition has an impact on speech or expression does not render the legis-
lation violative of the first amendment, providing, of course, that other
channels of communication are open and available.
CONTRACTS
JURISDICTION - FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CONFERRING JURISDICTION
- Roche v. Floral Rental Corp., 232 A.2d 162 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1967). -
Plaintiff's decedent was killed in New Jersey when his car collided with a
truck, allegedly as a result of negligence on the part of defendant J.C. Truck
Equipment, Inc. in the installation and maintenance of the truck body. De-
fendant was a New York firm that installed truck bodies for customers from
various States but all phases of its business were conducted in New York.
Defendant was served in New York in accordance with N.J.L Cirv. P. 4:4
(d), which restricts New Jersey jurisdiction over foreign corporate defend-
ants to the requirements of due process.
The court reversed the decision to set aside the service and held that,
considering the convenience of the forum, the nature and extent of defend-
ants business, its geographic location, and the fact that defendant could
forsee that the normal use of its product would almost inevitably bring it
into New Jersey, the requirements of due process were met. The case makes
New Jersey a leading State in extending jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions, even when the product is brought into the State indirectly.
PERFORMANCE OR BREACH - EXCUSES FOR NONPERFORMANCE - SecUr-
ity Sewage Equipment Co. v. McFerren, 11 Ohio App. 2d 229 (1967). -
The defendants, developers of a residential subdivision, contracted to build
a sewage treatment plant on their property for the plaintiff. They were
soon notified by State and county officials that they would have to comply
with OHIO REv. CODE § 3701.18 which requires approval by the State De-
partment of Health of plans for any sewage plant. The defendants were
unable to obtain this approval and the plaintiff sued for breach of contract.
The defendants alleged impossibility of performance. The court of appeals
reversed the trial court, holding that the defendants had the responsibility to
obtain approval for the sewage plant, and in contracting for this duty as-
sumed the risk of inability to obtain approval.
This case affirms the general rule that where a person enters into a con-
tract knowing that permission of the government will be required during
the course of performance, it is his duty to obtain the permit.
RESTRAINT OF TRADE OR COMPETITION IN TRADE - RmSTRICTION NEC-
ESSARY FOR PROTECTION - Shakey's Inc. v. Martin, 430 P.2d 504 (Idaho
1967). - Appellant granted respondent a 20-year franchise to operate a
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pizza parlor restaurant and to use the service mark "Shakey's" along with its
designated techniques of doing business, in return for a fixed fee and a per-
centage of gross food sales. The franchise included a noncompetitive clause
in which respondent agreed not to sell pizza products within a 30-mile ra-
dius for 1 year after the franchise terminated. Respondent subsequently sold
his holding to his partners (codefendants) who continued operations under
a new name. In reversing a judgment denying injunctive relief to the ap-
pellant, the court held that he had a legitimate, recognizable, and existing
business property interest in the franchise that warranted protection.
The decision affirmed Idaho's previous position with regard to the pro-
tection of franchises. The court adopted the majority view in holding that
restraints in noncompetitive clauses must be reasonably necessary to protect
the interests of a covenantor and that franchises are a sufficient interest to
be protected.
COURTS
COURTS OF APPEALS - DISCOVERY, PRODUCTION, AND EXAMINATION OF
DOCUMENTS - American Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. Transamerican In-
surance Co., 380 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1967). - In this case the district court
ordered appellant to turn over all nonprivileged documents in conformity
with discovery procedures. Appellants claimed that investigations performed
under control of counsel were privileged work-products and the district court
erred in requiring production of such documents. Appellants appealed this
order and asked for a writ of mandamus to decide whether work-product
immunity extends to work done by agents of an attorney. The Second Cir-
cuit held that orders requiring production of documents in discovery proc-
ess were not final decisions and therefore were not reviewable. It also held
that writs of mandamus may not be utilized in these circumstances.
This case reaffirms the court's practice of denying interlocutory review
of discovery orders. Whether work-product immunity from discovery ex-
tends to work done by agents or investigators of an attorney is left unde-
cided and conflicts in its application remain.
NUMBER OF JUDGES NECESSARY FOR ADJUDICATION - INJUNCTION
AGAINST ENFORCEMENT OF STATE STATUTE - Lamont v. Commissioner,
269 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). - Plaintiff asked for declaratory judg-
ment, injunctive relief, and money damages. He complained that his con-
stitutional right of privacy was violated by postal and telephone solicitations
which were the result of the sale of motor vehicle registration lists by the
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to a private corporation. The sales were
authorized by State law. Plaintiff moved for a three-judge panel pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284 (1964), to consider the question. The motion
was denied and the complaint dismissed by a single district judge.
The district court affirmed, stating that the plaintiff's complaint, al-
though novel, was unsubstantial and an unwarranted extension of the right
of privacy. The court also affirmed the power of a single judge to decide
whether a plea for injunction against the enforcement of a State statute
should be considered by a three-judge panel.
PROCEDURE - EFFECT OF REVERSAL OF PREVIOUS DECISION - State v.
Vigliano, 232 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1967). - Based heavily upon a confession
obtained by in-custody interrogation, the State obtained a first-degree murder
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conviction of defendant. The first trial was held prior to the Escobedo de-
cision. On appeal the defendant obtained a retrial which was held between
the Escobedo and Miranda decisions. Again the defendant appealed a con-
viction and won another new trial to commence after the effective date of
the Miranda decision. The appellate court was asked to determine which
rule should be applied to determine the admissibility of the defendant's con-
fession - Miranda, Escobedo, or the old voluntariness rule.
The United States Supreme Court's determination that the Escobedo and
Miranda rules were to apply only to "cases commenced" after the dates of
decision of these cases was interpreted by the New Jersey Supreme Court to
mean "cases first commenced" and not to apply to retrials when the original
trial was held prior to the effective date in question. The States are about
evenly split on the point.
CRIMINAL LAW
APPEAL AND ERROR - PROCEEDING IN FORMA PAUPERIS - State v.
Smith, 12 Ohio St. 2d 7 (1967). - In February, 1949, the petitioner, with-
out the aid of counsel, pleaded guilty to a charge of robbery. After serving
a portion of his sentence he filed a petition alleging the deprivation of his
constitutional right to counsel. The State conceded that the petitioner was
not represented by counsel at the time he pleaded guiltyand that the record
was silent as to whether he was advised of his right to counsel The court
of common pleas denied the petition without a hearing.
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, holding that the petitioner in a post-
conviction relief proceeding must have a hearing and be represented by
counsel if he alleges violations of his sixth amendment rights and the record
of the trial proceeding supports his allegations. However, the court further
noted that when the State did not propose to present any evidence which
would refute any of the allegations set forth by the petitioner, the appoint-
ment of counsel would not be necessary. In adopting this position Ohio
joins a minority of States.
GAMING - SEARCHES AND SEIZURES - Commonwealth v. Newman, 232
A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967). - Defendant appealed from a conviction on
a lottery charge claiming that evidence used against him was obtained in
violation of his constitutional privilege against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Three detectives armed with search and arrest warrants saw the
defendant in a second story window as they approached his house. When
they reached the front door they banged on it, announced their presence, but
after waiting 20 seconds without receiving a response, they forcibly entered.
In affirming the conviction the court held that it was not unreasonable
under the circumstances that the officers failed to announce their purpose
prior to the forceful entry. Citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963),
the court reasoned that even though the States are bound by the federal
standard of reasonableness implicit in the fourth amendment, they are not
precluded from making exceptions to the notice requirement where exigent
circumstances are present. The decision is consistent with that of other
States.
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION - STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - Com-
monwealth v. Howard, 232 A.2d 207 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967). - In 1958
appellant signed a waiver of indictment by grand jury, a waiver of counsel,
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and entered guilty pleas to four bills of indictment charging larceny and re-
ceiving stolen goods. At that time he was not represented by counsel. Ap-
pellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was granted in 1965 on the
ground that appellant had not intelligently and understandingly waived his
constitutional right to counsel in 1958. Appellant was again indicted in
December 1965, and in January 1966 he was found guilty on all four indict-
merts and sentenced.
At the 1966 trial appellant moved to quash the 1965 indictments on
the ground that they were barred by the statute of limitations and he later
asked for a new trial on the same ground. The court refused to quash the
indictments and denied appellant's motion for a new trial. The instant case
restates the law of Pennsylvania which gives a district attorney's bill of in-
dictment, presented to the court after waiver of indictment by the grand
jury, although not knowingly and intelligently made by a defendant, the
effect of tolling the statute of limitations.
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - NEcESSITY FOR HEARING - State ex fel.
Roy v. Tahash, 152 N.W.2d 301 (Minn. 1967). - Petitioner, convicted of
burglary, filed a writ of habeas corpus while serving a sentence, alleging
violation of his constitutional rights during trial. The trial court dismissed
the petition without affording petitioner an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner
appealed, charging that under recent United States Supreme Court decisions,
an evidentiary hearing is necessary on all post-conviction proceedings where
a deprivation of constitutional rights is alleged. The Supreme Court of
Minnesota affirmed the trial court's decision, stating that the evidentiary
hearing is mandatory only where there are material facts in dispute which
have not been resolved in the proceedings resulting in conviction, which
facts must be resolved in order to determine the issues raised on the merits.
In all other cases, the holding of a hearing is in the discretion of the trial
court.
In so holding, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the federal stand-
ard for habeas corpus proceedings and construed its recently enacted super-
vening post-conviction remedy statute as conforming to this federal stand-
ard.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES - VOLUNTARY CHARACTER OF CONSENT -
Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d 158 (1st Cir. 1967). - Appellants were
convicted of bank robbery in Rhode Island. Five weeks after the robbery,
appellant Gorman was arrested in New York City on a narcotics charge.
An FBI agent asked Gorman, who had been repeatedly advised of his con-
stitutional rights, if he had any objection to having his motel room searched.
Gorman replied that he had none. In searching Gorman's room, FBI agents
discovered a telephone number which led them to appellant Roche and
eventually culminated in appellants' conviction. On appeal, appellants con-
tended that Gorman's consent to the search was not voluntary.
In affirming the convictions, the court of appeals repeated the estab-
lished rule that when an accused is asked directly whether he objects to a
search and is given adequate warning concerning his rights to remain silent
and to counsel, his consent to the search is voluntary. Noteworthy was the
court's rejection of the recently suggested rule that a specific warning of
fourth amendment rights is necessary to validate a warrantless search.
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DAMAGES
AGGRAVATION, MTIGATION, AND REDUCTION OF Loss - REDUCTION BY
INSURANCE - Thompson v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 11 Ohio App. 2d 212, 229
N.E.2d 756 (1967). - In an action for damages for personal injury, the
lower court refused to allow appellant to introduce in evidence bills for med-
ical services which were paid by the Industrial Commission in connection
with an award under the Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act, thus prevent-
ing appellant from recovering the reasonable value of those services. The
exclusion was based on the theory that the direct payment of the medical
bills by the commission, and the fact that appellant paid nothing for the
insurance, rendered the services a gratuity. Therefore they should not be
included in damages.
In reversing, the appellate court found that payments for medical ser-
vices are an obligation of the patient, whether or not they are paid directly
by the commission. Also, the court reaffirmed the rule that, in Ohio, work-
men's compensation awards fall within the collateral doctrine, and cannot
be used by a defendant to reduce damages. In this view of workmen's com-
pensation, Ohio stands with the great majority of the States.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
STATUS AND LEGAL RELATIONS - LEGITMACY AND PARENTAGE - Bas-
ton V. Sears, 11 Ohio App. 2d 220, 229 N.E.2d 847 (1967). - Pursuant
to OHIO REV. CODE § 2721.02, appellant sought a declaratory judgment
establishing his status as appellee's minor son. The petition alleging bas-
tardy, his mother's subsequent marriage to a man other than appellee, and
an inadequate legal remedy to establish the relationship, was dismissed upon
demurrer. On appeal it was held that a child born out of wedlock may
bring a declaratory judgment action to declare his status as a son of the man
alleged to be his father and thereby secure an order for his support and
maintenance.
Noting first that the marriage of appellant's mother barred an action
in bastardy and second that it might be appellant's desire to avoid subject-
ing his reputed father to the punishment which could attend criminal pro-
ceedings, the court established a third right of action whereby parenthood
of an illegitimate child might be determined. The position of the court
prevails in a majority of jurisdictions.
DIVORCE
CUSTODY AND SUPPORT OF CHILDREN - ON DISIsSsAL OF ACTION OR
DENIAL OF DIVORCE - Holderle v. Holderle, 11 Ohio App. 2d 148, 229
N.E.2d 79 (1967). - The order of the trial court in a divorce action in-
cluded the denial of a divorce to either of the parties and a provision for
the custody and support of the minor children. The court of appeals re-
versed, holding that when a trial court denies a divorce without dismissing
either the petition or the cross-petition, the court lacks jurisdiction to award
custody. The court reasoned that OHIO REV. CODE §§ 3109.03, 3109.04
could not be invoked after a denial of divorce, unless a separate action was
commenced, because the parties are still married and have equal rights to
the children.
The result places Ohio in a minority position and restricts judges from
applying the seemingly incidental relief of custody in divorce cases merely
because the facts do not justify an outright divorce.
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HABEAS CORPUS
DISMISSAL - HEARING ON WRIT AND RETURN - Wilson v. Anderson,
379 F.2d 330 (9th Cit. 1967). - Appellee was convicted of forgery in the
California Superior Court. There, the trial judge instructed the jury that it
could consider the prosecutor's comments concerning appellee's failure to
testify. Recognizing the instruction as erroneous, the California District
Court on appeal held that the error was harmless and affirmed the judg-
ment. The United States district court set aside appellee's conviction on
the grounds that it violated the rule in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965).
In a reversal, the United States court of appeals narrowed the rule in
Griffin by basing its decision on Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18(1967). As stated in Chapman, "before a federal constitutional error can
be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt." The court went so far as to state that if
the error had not been committed, appellee would still have been found
guilty. The dissenting opinion urged that the error was not harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt.
INSURANCE
APPLICATION - EFFECT OF DELAY - Rasmussen v. Prudential Life Insur-
ance Co., 152 N.W.2d 359 (Minn. 1967). - Plaintiff's decedent applied
for a life insurance policy with the defendant through a local agent. Al-
though part of the premium was paid at that time, it was understood by the
parties that the policy would not become effective until approved by the
home office, and that this procedure usually took about 30 days. About a
month later the home office notified the agent that the application had been
rejected and proposed another policy. Ten or eleven days later the agent
went to the home of the deceased to tell him of the rejection and to present
the alternative proposal, but there learned of the applicant's death that same
morning. Plaintiff brought a negligence action for damages. The Minne-
sota Supreme Court held that there was not a cause of action ex delicto in
favor of the applicant against the insurer for the failure of the agent to
promptly notify the applicant of the rejection of its application and to sub-
mit the counterproposal authorized by the home office.
The court said that to hold otherwise would be to engage in judicial
legislation. Since there was no legal duty on the part of the insurance com-
pany to accept or reject an application for insurance or to submit a counter-
proposal, there could be no tort liability for the negligent delay. Hence, the
court rejected what appears to be the emerging doctrine that an insurance
company ought to be held to a higher standard than those who engage in
other types of commercial transactions because of the public character of
insurance.
LABOR
STRIKEBREAKING - DUTY TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY - Building Ser-
vice & Maintenance Union Local 47 v. St. Luke's Hospital, 11 Ohio Misc.
218, 227 N.E.2d 265 (C.P. 1967). - Plaintiff sought an injunction against
defendant hospital for breach of a Cleveland ordinance against strikebreak-
ing and to force the hospital to bargain collectively with the plaintiff. The
injunction was denied because the plaintiff failed to prove the intent neces-
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sary to constitute a violation of the ordinance and, at common law, strike-
breaking gives no rise to a cause of action on behalf of the striker replaced.
The court also held that the hospital could not be forced to bargain collec-
tively because nonprofit hospitals are not affected by federal law and under
the common law the employer has no duty to bargain collectively with his
employees.
In noting that nonprofit hospitals are not affected by federal law and
that Ohio has no statute dealing with mandatory collective bargaining, the
court did not wish to extend, but rather to merely reaffirm the Ohio com-
mon law. In dicta the court stated that it is the problem of the legislature
to find a solution and not the courts.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
RIGHT OF ACTION AND DEFENSES - EXISTENCE OF RELATION OF LAND-
LORD AND TENANT - Davis v'. Boyajian, Inc., II Ohio Misc. 97, 229 N.E.
2d 116 (C.P. 1967). - The defendant-lessees were in exclusive possession
of premises since the execution and recording of their lease, which was sub-
sequent to the plaintiff's mortgage from defendant's landlord. Thereafter
the mortgage was foreclosed and the lessees were not made parties to the
action. The plaintiff-mortgagee purchased the land at the judicial sale and
obtained a judgment for forcible entry and detainer against the lessees in
municipal court.
In reversing the lower court's decision, the common pleas court ruled
that because the lessees were not joined in the foreclosure action, their lease
was not terminated in that action. The decision of the court is in line with
the law in all heavily populated States where the question has been litigated.
The court also ruled that the lower court erred in exercising jurisdiction be-
cause title to the premises was drawn into question.
LIBEL AND SLANDER
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS AND MALICE THEREIN - REPORTS OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS - American District Telegraph Co. v. Brink's, Inc.,
380 F.2d 131 (7th Cir. 1967). - In a separate law suit Brink's, Inc. had
charged American District Telegraph Co. (ADT) with fraudulent misrepre-
sentations. Before any judicial determination in this case was made, Brink's
prepared a press release and distributed it to various newspapers and news
services -who then published that the suit had been filed along with some
of the allegations made by Brink's. ADT sued Brink's for libel. The dis-
trict court of Illinois sustained Brink's motion for summary judgment.
In affirming the district court's decision, the circuit court held that Illi-
nois law provided adequate authority for the privilege of the press to pub-
lish pleadings before a judicial determination to constitute a defense in the
instant case. In a majority of States there is no privilege to publish plead-
ings before a judicial determination. This latter view prevents the initiation
of untenable law suits for the purpose of effecting defamatory harm on the
defendant before dismissal of the action.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
MALPRACTICE - DISCOVERY RULE - Owens v. White, 380 F.2d 310 (9th
Cir. 1967). - Based upon the appellee-physician's diagnosis of a lump on
appellanes breast as a malignant cancerous growth, appellant underwent a
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radical mastectomy and radiation treatments. Four years after her last con-
tact with appellee and after she had moved from Idaho to California, appel-
lant was advised that she had never been afflicted with cancer. Idaho's
discovery rule in "foreign object" cases is that an action for malpractice
accrues when the patient knows or should know of the alleged malpractice.
Contrary to a prevailing tendency to allow an aggrieved party his day in
court, the district court concluded that in tempering the discovery rule with
equitable considerations an Idaho court would not toll the 2-year statute of
limitations in cases of alleged misdiagnosis. On appeal, held, affirmed.
The dissent, concededly upon the premise that the discovery doctrine
concerns itself with the point in time at which an action accrues and not
with problems of proof, could find no basis for distinguishing cases involv-
ing alleged misdiagnosis from those in which a foreign object is negligently
left in the patient's body.
MECHANICS' LIENS
ENFORCEMENT - PERSONAL LIABILITY ON FAILURE TO ESTABLISH LIEN
- McDonald v. Filice, 60 Cal Rptr. 832 (Ct. App. 1967). - Plaintiff
performed architectural services for the defendant. This employment agree-
ment was terminated by mutual consent before any improvements were
constructed on defendant's land but after plaintiff had drawn both prelimi-
nary and working plans. The appellate court reversed the trial court in part
holding that no mechanic's lien attached to the land since no improvements
were made thereon, and affirmed in part saying that "[o]nce a court ac-
quires jurisdiction in a suit to enforce a mechanic's lien it has jurisdiction to
render a personal judgment for the amount claimed against any party liable
therefore, even if the right to a lien is denied."
Most courts adhere to the rule announced in the instant case where the
plaintiff in his pleading asks for both a personal judgment and foreclosure
of a mechanids lien. Yet this court takes a more liberal stand and states
that even where a plaintiff does not include a demand for a personal judg-
ment in an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien, such an exclusion does not
preclude or dissolve the defendant's personal liability to plaintiff for services
rendered.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
SUSPENSION AND REMOVAL OF POLICEMEN - GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL
- Gardner v. Broderick, 282 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1967). - Appellant, a New
York City policeman, was dismissed from his position when he refused to
waive his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and to answer
questions concerning the conduct of his office. The lower court dismissed
the petition for an order to reinstate appellant to his position. The court of
appeals affirmed, reasoning that since appellant had refused to waive and
had refused to testify, his conduct constituted employee insubordination, and
the city charter provision authorizing his dismissal was proper.
Distinguishing the case from Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493
(1967), the court reasoned that if the appellant had executed the waiver
and had testified as to his misconduct, his testimony, although inadmissible
in a criminal prosecution, would have justified his dismissal from the police
force. The decision reaffirms the majority position which is increasingly
coming under attack.
CASES NOTED
TORTS - ACTs OR OMISSIONS OF OFFICERS OR AGENTS - Hall v. Yoangs-
town, 11 Ohio App. 2d 195, 229 N.E.2d 660 (1967). - The city fire de-
partment answered a fire call at the home of the plaintiff. When the hy-
drant across the street did not operate, and until hoses could be connected to
another hydrant, water from tanks was sprayed on the fire. The plaintiffs
son perished in the fire. The city alleged it was not liable because it was act-
ing in a governmental, nonproprietary capacity. The common pleas court
agreed. Reversing the lower court, the appellate court held that the city
would be liable in tort, if proximate cause were shown, because the city,
through its water department, was acting in a proprietary capacity.
The case is one of first impression in Ohio. The majority of jurisdic-
tions hold a municipality liable in tort when it acts in a proprietary capacity,
but not when it acts in a governmental capacity. When the issue is in dis-
pute, the trend has been to hold the city liable.
OFFICERS
RESTRICTIONS ON CivIL SERVICE LAWS OR RULES - TRANSFER AND PRO-
MOTION - State ex rel. Marshall v. Civil Service Commission, 228 N.E.2d
913 (Ohio Ct. App. 1967). - Plaintiff, who had 18 years of service as a
fireman and about 5-months service as assistant fire chief, was denied ap-
proval of his application to take a promotional civil service examination to
attain the rating of fire chief. Approval was denied by the Civil Service
Commission personnel director on the ground that plaintiff did not possess
the qualification of 6 months as assistant fire chief. The court of appeals
reversed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, holding that the Civil
Service Commission rule giving the personnel director discretion to reject
an application for any "just and reasonable cause" was invalid because unrea-
sonable, arbitrary, and discriminatory.
Reasoning that the city charter grants such power only to the Civil Ser-
vice Commission officers and not to the personnel director, the decision fur-
ther advances the effort to define the scope of powers in administrative law.
SALES
WARRANTIES - EXCLUSION BY ExPRESS WARRANTY - Manheim v. Ford
Motor Co., 201 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1967). - Plaintiff, the purchaser of a new
Lincoln Continental, claimed that the vehicle failed to operate properly, and
gave him no useful service despite many attempts at repair by the dealer.
Plaintiff alleged that he relied upon the representations and warranties in
the various advertising media that the car was of excellent workmanship and
suitable for use as a motor vehicle. The defendant-manufacturer made cer-
tain warranties of workmanship and freedom from defects to the dealer, but
expressly stated that these warranties were in lieu of any implied warranties
of merchantability or fitness. The contract between manufacturer and dealer
specifically denied authority to the dealer to bind the manufacturer and dis-
claimed liability to the ultimate consumer.
The Supreme Court of Florida held unanimously that neither lack of
privity between the manufacturer and the ultimate purchaser nor a written
warranty between manufacturer and dealer specifically disclaiming implied
warranties would preclude recovery here. This decision supports the rap-
idly growing tendency in the United States that under proper circtmstances,
such as a purchaser's reliance on advertisements, the ultimate purchaser may
recover from the remote vendor.
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TAXATION
LEVY AND APPORTIONMENT - DETERMINATION OF RATE OF TAXATION
- Cambridge City School District v. Guernsey County Budget Commission,
11 Ohio App. 2d 77, 228 N.E.2d 874 (1967). - Appellant complains of
reduction of its minimum levy from 4.4 to 4.0 mills as a result of the partial
annexation of another school system. The court held that under OHIO REv.
CODE § 5705.3(D) the minimum levy prescribed by law for appellants was
4.4 mills and could not be reduced by the Budget Commission or the Board
of Tax Appeals. The majority found this statute dear and unambiguous
needing no construction or interpretation of its legislative intent.
The dissenting opinion, on the other hand, could find no statutory pro-
vision governing a combining of territories with different mandatory mini-
mum levies. The dissent claimed that legislative intent dictated that the
levy be somewhere between 4.0 and 4.4 at the discretion of the commission
and board. The majority held to a literal and strict interpretation of the
statutes, while the minority took a more liberal and flexible approach.
WILLS
ELECTION BY SURVIVING SPOUSE - ELECTION BY COURT FOR INCOMPE-
TENT SPOUSE - In re Estate of Stranch, 11 Ohio App. 2d 173, 229 N.E.2d
95 (1967). - Testator died leaving 10 percent of an $88,205 net estate to
his surviving spouse in his will. By statute in Ohio the surviving spouse
is entitled to 50 percent of the net estate or may take under the provisions
of the will, but an election must be made. Because the surviving spouse
had been adjudged incompetent and unable to make a valid election, the
probate court was required to make the election for her. Taking into ac-
count the spouse's age, her own personal estate of $153,000, the tax circum-
stances, and the provisions of the mutual wills, the probate court held that
it was better for the spouse to take under the will. Legatees appealed claim-
ing that the election was an abuse of discretion.
The court of appeals, in reversing, stated that the probate court when
making an election for an incompetent spouse is bound to the statutory cri-
teria and must choose the provision that is "better for" the surviving spouse.
The court held that the larger sum was the "obvious" choice. This position
is contrary to the enlightened approach of an increasing number of courts
which goes beyond strict monetary considerations in determining what is
"better for" the surviving spouse.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
ACTION AGAINST PHYSICIAN OR SURGEON FOR MALPRACTICE - RIGHTS
OF EMPLOYEE OR HIS DEPENDENTS - Jones v. Bouza, 152 N.W.2d 393
(Mich. Ct. App. 1967). - Plaintiff sustained a back injury while doing
manual labor as an employee of the Ford Motor Company. He alleged that
the injury was aggravated by negligent treatment he received from the staff
physician, a full-time, salaried employee of the company. Although plain-
tiff had been receiving workmen's compensation benefits from the date of
the injury, he claimed that a suit against the physician was not barred by
the provisions of the workmen's compensation act. The statute confers im-
munity from suit by an employee on natural persons in the same employ.
The Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's dismissal of the
action, reasoning that the statute intended to confer this immunity on all
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persons carrying on activities of the employer, regardless of their nature.
The court further held that the inclusion of full-time staff physicians, but
not other physicians recommended by an employer, did not violate the equal
protection clauses of the Michigan and United States Constitutions.
Although decisions in other jurisdictions seem not to be in accord, it
must be noted that State workmen's compensation laws vary considerably,
and in most cases, the physician involved was not an exclusive employee of
the company.
